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Abstract
In this note we revisit the result by Menezes and Quiggin (2012),
showing that under linear supply function competition, the same Nash
equilibrium results when rms choose slopes or intercepts of their sup-
ply functions. This is because the rst order conditions emerging in
the two strategy spaces are not linearly independent.
JEL Codes: D43, L13
Keywords: supply function; linear independence
1
1 Introduction
After the seminal paper by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), the literature on
supply functions has been growing in several directions. This is no surprise,
because supply function competition represents an interesting option when
modelling oligopolistic interaction. However, the complexity of the Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989) setting has stimulated approaches designed to make
their original model more tractable.
More precisely, we have witnessed a special focus on linear supply func-
tions. One of the models proposed in this vein is in Menezes and Quiggin
(2012), where rms choose the intercept of their linear supply functions, while
the slope is treated as a parameter, in such a way that, if the slope is nil,
the equilibrium outcome replicates Cournot, whereas if the slope is innitely
high, it replicates Bertrand or perfect competition.
Menezes and Quiggins (2012) formulation, however, allows one to treat
also the slope as a strategic variable. This is what we do in this paper. We
show that the resulting rst order conditions in the extended strategy space
formed by both intercepts and slopes are not linearly independent and the
Nash equilibrium generated by choosing either one is the same.
We set up the model in section 2. Section 3 contains our results, and
section 4 concludes by underlying some extensions.
2 The model
Consider an oligopoly formed by n identical rms selling a homogeneous
good whose market demand function is p = a Q; where p is market price,
a > 0 is a parameter measuring market size (which is normalised to one in
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Menezes and Quiggin (2012)) and industry output Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is the sum of
all individual outputs qi. Firm is cost function is Ci = cqi where parameter
c 2 (0; a). Menezes and Quiggin (2012) specify the individual rms supply
function as qi = i   c=n+  (p  c) ; where intercept i > 0 is the strategic
variable, while slope   0 is a parameter. It is worth noting that this
supply function is increasing in the mark-up; the intercept is normalised the
characterisation of equilibrium.
In view of Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006), where the supply func-
tion is qi = ip and the slope is the strategic variable, we extend Menezes
and Quiggins (2012) approach by stipulating that the supply function is as
follows:
qi = i   c
n
+ i (p  c) (1)
where both the intercept i > 0 and the slope i  0 are strategic variables.
Solving the ex ante market-clearing condition, we get
p =
a Pni=1 i + c (1 +Pni=1 i)
1 +
Pn
i=1 i
(2)
so that the individual prot function is
i = (p  c) qi = (3)
a Pni=1 i + c (1 +Pni=1 i)
1 +
Pn
i=1 i
  c

i   c
n

+
i

a Pni=1 i + c (1 +Pni=1 i)
1 +
Pn
i=1 i
  c
2
3 Results
While Menezes and Quiggin (2012, p. 713) assume i =  for all i =
1; 2; 3; :::; n and take rst order conditions (FOCs) w.r.t. is, we calculate
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the FOCs w.r.t. both is and is:
@i
@i
=
c  n
h
2i +
P
j 6=i j

+ a (i  )
i
n2
= 0 (4)
@i
@i
=
(a Pni=1 i) hc  n2i +Pj 6=i j+ a (i  )i
n3
= 0 (5)
where   1 +Pni=1 i and   1 +Pj 6=i j. Looking at the system (4-5),
it appears that
@i
@i
=
@i
@i
 a 
Pn
i=1 i

(6)
which implies the following:
Lemma 1 If the strategy space of the game in supply functions includes both
the slope and the intercept of each rms supply, strategic variables are not
linearly independent.
The above Lemma immediately implies a relevant consequence:
Proposition 2 Under linear supply competition, the Nash equilibrium is in-
dependent of the combination of intercepts and slopes chosen by rms.
That is to say, the Nash equilibrium of this game can be equivalently
obtained by (i) posing i =  in (4) and then solving for i or (ii) posing
i =  in (5) and then solving for i. This entails that rm i may not even
know (and in fact, doesnt care to know) whether any rival rm j is using
(4) or (5).
It is a matter of simple algebra to show that the two methods indeed
lead to the same outcome. Procedure (i) yields the same Nash equilibrium
solution as in Menezes and Quiggin (2012, eq. (5), p. 713):
 =
c (1 + n) + an [1 +  (n  2)]
n [n+ 1 + n (n  1)] (7)
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Procedure (ii) yields
 =
c+ n [a   (n+ 1)]
n [n (n  1)  a (n  2)  c] (8)
and then it is easily veried that  and  are invertible, with  = () 1.
Using , the equilibrium price p is as in Menezes and Quiggin (2012, eq.
(6), p. 173), with
pj=0 =
a+ cn
n+ 1
; lim
!1
p = c (9)
reproducing the special cases of Cournot and Bertrand (or perfect competi-
tion), respectively. If one uses instead ; the resulting price is
p =
c+ n (n  1)  a (n  2)
2
(10)
with
p =
a+ cn
n+ 1
at  =
an+ c
n (n+ 1)
= j=0 (11)
and
p = c at  =
a (n  2) + c
n (n  1) = lim!1
 (12)
Then, the equivalence between the two above procedures is complete.
4 Extensions
The result stated in Proposition 1 extends to a more general setup in which
the cost function includes a quadratic component, becomingCi = qi (c+ bqi=2) ;
as in Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006).1 In this case, one may simply
rewrite the individual supply function as
qi = i   @Ci=@qi
n
+ i (p  c) (13)
1In Klemperer and Meyer (1989), the marginal cost is actually assumed to be non-
negative.
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and then proceed as above.
Moreover, because of the lack of linear independence between (4) and (5),
it can also be shown that exactly the same equilibrium outcome arises if the
game takes a two-stage structure in which the rst stage takes place in the
-space and the second stage in the -space (or the opposite).
Finally, one may wonder about the specic normalisation adopted by
Menezes and Quiggin (2012). It can be easily shown that our result does not
depend on it, by reconstructing the foregoing argument under the assumption
that the supply function is written as qi = i + ip.
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